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Abstract
We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator
and a regulated rm. The regulator is required to monitor the rms costs and reveal
its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope
for collusion between the regulator and the rm, which results in the manipulation of the
regulators report on the rms costs to Congress. The rms benet of collusion arises from
the higher price the e¢ cient rm is allowed to charge when the regulator reports that it
is ine¢ cient. However, a higher price reduces the gains from trade the parties can share
in the bargaining process. As a result of this trade-o¤, the e¢ cient rm has a stake in
collusion only if the regulators bargaining power in the regulatory relationship is relatively
high. Then, we derive the optimal institutional response to collusion and characterize the
conditions under which allowing collusion is desirable.
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1. Introduction
Regulatory intervention is usually thought of as the use of the government power to coerce
for the purpose of restricting rms decisions when unfettered competition turns out to be
inappropriate. This is the case in relevant portions of electricity, gas, sanitation, telecommuni-
cations, transportation and water industries. In the economic literature, regulation is typically
modeled as the power to command and control, and a regulatory policy is the outcome of a
take-it-or-leave-ito¤er from a regulatory agency to a regulated rm.
In practice, however, regulation is usually a process of give-and-take rather than of take-
it-or-leave-it. On the one hand, regulators issue rules in the form of administrative acts which
ll in details the authorizing legislation. Given the general and vague policy aims provided by
the legislation (which constitutes a form of contract incompleteness), regulators are left with
some power when regulating the industry. On the other hand, regulated rms generally do
not comply in a fully passive manner with regulatory decisions. They may threaten to appeal
against the regulators decisions in order to obtain some revisions. The desire to avoid a rule
being repealed in the courts can determine the form of the rule that is nally adopted. More
importantly, this is not the only means to directly a¤ect the regulatory outcome. A regulator
usually must fulll a set of procedural requirements that limit the exercise of policies in the
form of command and control.
The US Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 provides that rulemaking procedures
may be either formal, with hearings resembling a court trial, or informal, with notice of rule-
making and public comments. Concerned parties are allowed to express their viewpoints by
presenting evidence on the e¤ects of the regulators actions and on questions of fact. Regula-
tory hearings are typically characterized by repeated revisions of rate proposals. In reaction to
complaints, the regulator puts forward a new set of rules and amendments to the existing ones.
Therefore, rulemaking is not usually the direct product of the regulators at, but it arises from
a process of intensive scrutiny.
This suggests that regulation tends to be the outcome of a bargaining process. Empirical
evidence seems to support this view. For instance, the presence of turnover costs can weaken
the threat to replace an incumbent rm which is reluctant to accept a regulatory policy. Kahn
(1988) observes that in public utilities the relationship between a regulator and a regulated rm
generally constitutes a bilateral monopoly which induces the parties to achieve a compromise. In
their analysis of the features of the regulatory process in the US, Viscusi et al. (2005) emphasize
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the inuence of private players (mainly, rms) on regulatory outcomes. Rossi (2011) explores
the increasing scope for bargaining in regulatory relationships after the liberalization process.1
In a seminal survey on optimal regulation, Armstrong and Sappington (2007, p. 1564) recognize
that the standard approach in the literature, which ignores negotiations between the regulator
and the rm, generally is adopted for technical convenience rather than for realism.
In this paper, we model the interaction between a regulator and a regulated rm as a
bargaining process. The economic literature typically assumes that the regulator has the full
power to dictate the regulatory contract to the rm. The main contribution of this paper is to
investigate the impact of the bargaining powers of the regulator and the rm in a regulatory
process on the scope for collusion between the parties. This approach generalizes the standard
command and control formulation, where all the bargaining power is allocated to the regulator,
and allows a broader analysis of the optimal institutional response to collusion.
In our model, the regulator is required to monitor the rms costs and reveal its information
to a political principal (Congress). As it is well established in the literature (e.g., Tirole 1986,
1992), this raises the possibility of collusion between the rm and the regulator, which can
manipulate its audit report to Congress in exchange for a side transfer from the rm. Frequent
news reports of corruption and lax regulation suggest that collusion is a widespread phenom-
enon. La¤ont and Tirole (1993, Ch. 11) report that a regulated rm has several means to
inuence public decision making. For instance, it can bribe the regulatory o¢ cials through gra-
tuities or the o¤er of job positions in the regulated rm after their retirement (revolving door
phenomenon). Furthermore, personal relationships provide incentives for the regulatory sta¤
to treat their industry partners kindly. The rm may also cater to the regulators concern for
tranquility by refraining from criticizing publicly its management. As Estache and Wren-Lewis
(2009) point out, the problems of collusion and corruption are particularly severe in developing
countries.
It is well known in the collusion literature that an e¢ cient rm has a stake in collusion with
the regulator. We show that this standard conclusion holds only if the regulators bargaining
power is relatively high. The rationale behind our result lies in the trade-o¤ the rm faces when
colluding with the regulator. The benet of collusion arises from the higher price the e¢ cient
rm is allowed to charge when the collusive regulator manipulates information before Congress
and reports that the rm is ine¢ cient. However, a higher price shrinks the gains from trade
1For the relevance of regulatory bargaining in the US, we also refer to the analysis of Morriss et al. (2005).
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the parties can share in the bargaining process. Since these gains are redistributed according to
the partiesbargaining powers, a strong regulator reduces the gains the rm can appropriate.
As a consequence, if the regulators bargaining power is su¢ ciently high, the rms benet of a
higher collusive price outweighs the cost of lower gains from trade, and the rm has an incentive
to collude.
These results suggest that the scope for collusion crucially depends on the bargaining powers
of the parties involved in the regulatory process. The bargaining power of a party can arise
either from the authorizing legislation or the regulatory environment, which determines each
partys strength in the regulatory relationship. If the regulator can impose to a large extent
its decisions, it enjoys a high bargaining power vis-à-vis the regulated rm. In line with the
standard command and control approach, our analysis predicts that the e¢ cient rm has a stake
in collusion. However, we show that a su¢ ciently high bargaining power of the rm removes its
incentive to collude.
Afterwards, we derive the optimal institutional response to collusion. In particular, we
characterize the conditions under which it is desirable to preclude collusion either through an
incentive payment to the regulator or the shutdown of the ine¢ cient rm and the conditions that
make allowing collusion optimal. This can be the case when the regulators bargaining power
is high enough. The reason for this result is that a strong regulator increases the rms stake
in collusion, which makes it more costly to deter collusion. We nd that allowing collusion can
be also optimal when consumer demand is relatively inelastic, such as in markets for essential
services (e.g., energy, sanitation). A rigid demand facilitates collusion since it reduces the loss
in the gains from trade due to a higher price, and therefore deterring collusion becomes more
expensive.
We feel that our analysis provides some predictions that may contribute to the practical and
theoretical debate on regulation and collusion.
2. Related literature
As Armstrong and Sappington (2007) point out, the economic literature generally assumes that
the regulator possesses all the bargaining power in its interaction with the regulated rm. A
relevant exception is Spulber (1988, 1989), who provides a broad description of the bargaining
approach to regulation and derives e¢ cient mechanisms when regulation follows from negotia-
tions between the rm and consumers, while the regulator is a neutral arbiter. Our approach
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is more closely related to Scarpa (1994), who considers a setting where the regulator actively
participates in the regulatory process by bargaining with the rm over a regulatory policy. He
shows that the rm might overinvest in order to a¤ect the regulators threat point. Along these
lines, Amacher and Malik (1996) present a model of environmental regulation where the rm
and the regulator engage in negotiations over the rms emission standard.
These contributions ignore the possibility of collusion. Our purpose is to investigate the
scope for collusion when regulation is the outcome of a bargaining process. The interest of eco-
nomic literature for collusive phenomena has been sparked by the seminal contribution of Stigler
(1971), which emphasizes the industrys ability to inuence regulatory powers in order to obtain
favors. After Stigler (1971), a wide literature has developed, which is exhaustively surveyed by
Aidt (2003). The early theoretical work on collusion within the framework of asymmetric infor-
mation traces back to Tirole (1986, 1992), which explores the e¤ects of coalitions on the optimal
incentive schemes. We refer to La¤ont (2000) for a broad survey. Along these lines, La¤ont and
Tirole (1991) investigate the institutional responses to the possibility of collusion. Extending
the previous work, Kofman and Lawarrée (1993, 1996) analyze the scope for collusion in the
presence of honest and dishonest auditors. Khalil and Lawarrée (2006) consider the possibility
of collusion when the principal cannot commit to an audit activity. A relevant contribution for
our purposes is Ida and Anbashi (2008), who derive the optimal regulatory design in an ad-
verse selection model and show that collusion can lead to information-sharing e¤ects which are
socially desirable. Interestingly, we also nd that allowing collusion may be welfare-enhancing;
however, our results are driven by di¤erent forces that arise from the bargaining process in a
regulatory relationship.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 sets out the formal model. Section
4 derives the conditions under which the rm has an incentive to collude with the regulator.
Section 5 characterizes the optimal institutional response to collusion. Section 6 concludes. All
proofs are collected in the Appendix.
3. The model
Preferences Consumer demand is described by a decreasing function q (p), with @q@p < 0.
Consumer surplus is given by
CS =
Z
p
q (po) dpo   t  sr, (1)
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where p is a unit price for the good and t is a xed charge (transfer), while sr  0 denotes
the remuneration to the regulator (see below).2 Limited liability constraints imply that the
regulator must receive an income at least equal to its reservation wage, which is normalized to
zero (e.g., Armstrong and Sappington 2007; La¤ont 2000, Ch. 2).
The regulated rms prot is
 = pq (p)  ciq (p) + t, (2)
where the marginal cost ci, i 2 fl; hg, is the rms private information. With probability
 2 (0; 1), the cost is cl and with probability 1    the cost is ch, where c  ch   cl > 0.
Without loss of generality, we ignore the xed costs of production.
Regulation The political principal, labeled as Congress, cares about consumer surplus in
(1),3 and delegates the task of regulation to a regulator.4 The regulator supervises the rm and
obtains a signal about the rms marginal costs ci (see below). The regulator is also involved
in a bargaining process with the rm about a regulatory policy (p; t).
The regulator can be either benevolent or non-benevolent. With probability  2 (0; 1),
the regulator is benevolent and perfectly internalizes Congress objective, i.e., Vb = CS. It
always reports truthfully to Congress the signal about the rms costs. With probability 1  ,
the regulator is non-benevolent and cares only about its private income s, i.e., Vnb = s. This
income may arise from two sources. The rm may bribe the regulator to manipulate the signal
detrimental to the rm. Alternatively, in response to the threat of collusion, Congress may
design an incentive payment to the regulator. This approach reects the common idea that
auditors can be of di¤erent types and, under identical circumstances, an auditor may accept
a bribe while another may reject it (e.g., Kofman and Lawarrée 1996). Alternatively, some
auditors may be endowed with transaction technologies which can facilitate collusion (Tirole
1992).
2The xed payment t for the good and the remuneration to the regulator sr can be nanced through public
funds (e.g., Baron 1989).
3This is in line, among others, with La¤ont and Tirole (1990), who assume that regulatory institutions result
from a constitution drafted by some benevolent founding fathers. Our qualitative results carry over with a
weight (lower than 1) on the rms prots. Without loss of generality, we neglect the shadow cost of public funds
(e.g., La¤ont and Tirole 1986) due to distortionary taxation that nances transfers to the rm and the regulator.
This cost increases unnecessarily further the weight of taxation in the welfare standard, without a¤ecting the
qualitative results (Armstrong and Sappington 2007).
4Delegation results from Congress lack of time, skills or resources to perform this task (e.g., La¤ont 2000,
Ch. 2).
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Auditing The supervisory technology is characterized by perfect monitoring, so that the
signal the regulator receives about the rms costs is fully informative. Admittedly, this is a
simplifying assumption. An obvious implication of introducing a supervision technology which
informs the regulator only with positive probability is that the scope for collusion would be
smaller.5 Note that, in our setting, we could obtain a similar e¤ect with a higher probability of
a benevolent regulator. Therefore, our qualitative results would carry over with this alternative
informational structure, but the analysis would be less transparent.
The information provided by the signal cannot be veried by Congress. The assumption
that an auditor may possess soft(i.e., unveriable) information about the rms technology
is well established in the literature (e.g., Baliga 1999; Faure-Grimaud et al. 2003; La¤ont and
Rochet 1997). In our setting, this implies that the regulator may alter the outcome of its audit
activity and convey a report r 2 fcl; chg which di¤ers from the rms real costs ci. Forging the
signal represents the regulators degree of discretion: it may alter the report on the rms costs
since Congress cannot ascertain this manipulation. A dishonest regulator has an incentive to
manipulate the signal and collude with the rm.6
The collusive agreement between the regulator and the rm is supposed to be enforceable,
even though it is illegal.7 However, collusion entails a deadweight loss associated with side
transfers between the rm and the regulator. For instance, a monetary bribe exposes the
parties to the possibility of legal sanctions. Alternatively, the regulatory commissioners value
non-monetary side transfers (e.g., entertainment or employment opportunities after the tenure
in the regulatory agency) less than the monetary expenses incurred by the rm. Following
La¤ont and Tirole (1991, 1993, Ch. 11), we capture the ine¢ ciency of side contracting by a
shadow cost of side transfers   0. This reects the idea that each unit of income received by
the regulator costs 1 +  units to the regulated rm.
Timing The sequence of events unfolds as follows.
(I) Nature chooses the type of the rm (costs cl or ch) and the type of the regulator (benevolent
5Economic literature usually assumes that the rm observes the signal received by the regulator (e.g., Kofman
and Lawarrée 1996; La¤ont and Tirole 1991). When the signal is uninformative, the rm clearly does not have
any incentive to collude.
6 In line with the main literature (e.g., Kofman and Lawarrée 1996; La¤ont and Tirole 1991), we assume that
the regulator cannot forge the signal against the rms will. For instance, the rm is able to prove before Congress
its actual costs.
7The enforcement of side contracts may rely on non-judicial mechanisms, such as reputation in long-term
relationships or the word of honorin the one-shot relationships. We refer to La¤ont and Tirole (1993, Ch. 11)
for a discussion of this assumption.
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or non-benevolent). The rm and the regulator privately learn their type.
(II) Congress o¤ers the regulator a contract which species a remuneration sr.
(III) The regulator can either accept or reject the o¤er. If it rejects the o¤er, it receives a
reservation utility (normalized to zero) and the game ends. If it accepts, it performs the audit
activity and learns the rms costs. The rm discovers whether the regulator is benevolent or
non-benevolent.8
(IV) The regulator and the rm negotiate over a regulatory policy (p; t). If the regulator is
honest, it reports truthfully to Congress the information about the rms costs. If the regulator
is dishonest, it may collude and sign a side contract with the rm. In this case, the regulator
manipulates its information and sends a report which misrepresents the rms costs. The
regulator receives from the rm a side transfer sf for this manipulation.
(V) Contracts are executed and the regulatory policy is implemented.
The timing of this game is fairly standard in collusion models relevant for our purposes (e.g.,
Kofman and Lawarrée 1996). Figure 1 illustrates the main features of the regulatory process in
our setting. The equilibrium concept we adopt is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We
solve this game by backward induction.
Nash bargaining solution Since regulation is the outcome of a bargaining process, we need
to nd a model for this approach. It is well known that the outcome of a bargaining game is very
sensitive to all the details of the negotiation process as well as to the delay costs of the players,
namely, to all the bargaining protocols. For instance, in a simple one-shot simultaneous o¤er
protocol, there exist multiple subgame perfect equilibria even using strong renement concepts
(Sákovics 1993). Hence, rather than describe the bargaining procedure in full detail, we prefer to
characterize the bargaining outcome by adopting the cooperative Nash (1950, 1953) bargaining
solution.
As Spulber (1989, Ch. 2) emphasizes, a crucial feature of a regulatory hearing process is
the direct interaction between players which may result in a consensus, so that the regulatory
bargaining game can be modeled as a cooperative game. Even though there are alternative
cooperative concepts, we feel that the Nash bargaining solution is the most convincing and
e¤ective for our purposes. This modeling choice can be justied on several grounds. First, the
8This assumption is quite common in the collusion literature (e.g., Kofman and Lawarrée 1996). The rm
can discover the regulators type by proposing to collude. A benevolent regulator does not accept the proposal,
while a non-benevolent regulator is willing to collude. Attempted bribery is not punishable, since it is extremely
di¢ cult or costly to prove. Alternatively, the regulator can show its type by taking the initiative to collude.
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Figure 1: The three-tier regulatory process
generality of the Nash solution avoids the specication of a particular extensive form structure.9
Second, the Nash solution is e¢ cient so that our results do not depend on the unexploited gains
from trade in the specic bargaining procedures which may be considered. This implies that
our approach might underestimate the transaction costs between the colluding parties; however,
we capture this aspect with a shadow cost of side transfers. Third, the uniqueness of the Nash
solution allows Congress to anticipate the bargaining outcome, which is helpful for the derivation
of Congressoptimal response. Fourth, the asymmetric version of the Nash solution captures
in a simple but e¤ective manner the partiesbargaining powers, which play a crucial role in
our analysis. As we will show, the Nash solution leads to tractable calculations and plausible
results of some interest.
4. The rms incentive to collude
We rst characterize the regulatory policy when the regulator is benevolent. In this case, it
cares about consumer surplus, i.e., Vb = CS, and collusion is not an issue. Hence, Congress
nds it optimal to provide the regulator with the lowest income, i.e., sr = 0. Afterwards, we
examine the rms incentive to collude when the regulator is non-benevolent.
Using the Nash bargaining approach, when the rms cost is ci, i 2 fl; hg, the outcome of
9 It is well known that the Nash solution can arise in di¤erent extensive form structures (e.g., Binmore and
Dasgupta 1987; Osborne and Rubinstein 1990).
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bargaining over a regulatory policy (p; t) is the solution to the following maximization problem
max
p;t
[CS (p; t)]  [ (p; t; ci)]1  s.t. CS (p; t)  0,  (p; t; ci)  0, (3)
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the regulators bargaining power and 1  the rms bargaining power
in the negotiation process. A high  means that the regulator is powerful vis-à-vis the rm. This
may follow from the authorizing legislation or statutory rules, which give the regulator a large
inuence on the regulatory outcome. In particular, if  = 1, the regulator has full bargaining
power and can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the rm. Conversely, if  is low, the rm has
the power to crucially a¤ect the regulatory policy, for instance by threatening to appeal against
the regulatory proposals. Since the regulatory relationship constitutes a bilateral monopoly
(Kahn 1988), it is natural to assume that production does not occur if bargaining fails. Hence,
the utility associated with the disagreement outcome is normalized to zero for both players.
The following lemma summarizes the main features of the regulatory policy.
Lemma 1 If the regulator is benevolent, the regulatory policy exhibits the following features:
(i) the price equals marginal costs, i.e., pb = ci
(ii) the xed charge amounts to tb = (1  ) Rciq (p) dp
(iii) the partiespayo¤s are
CSb = 
Z
ci
q (p) dp (4)
b = (1  )
Z
ci
q (p) dp.
Since the Nash bargaining solution is e¢ cient, the negotiated regulatory policy implements
marginal cost pricing, independently of the partiesbargaining powers. A price equal to marginal
costs maximizes the gains from trade the parties can share, which amount to
R
ci
q (p) dp. The
xed charge t redistributes these gains between parties according to their bargaining powers.
Now, we turn to the possibility of collusion between the regulator and the rm. A dishon-
est regulator, which cares only about its income, may manipulate the outcome of the audit
activity in exchange for a side transfer from the rm and send Congress a report r 2 fcl; chg
that di¤ers from the rms real costs ci. As we are interested in the scope for collusion, we
assume for the time being that Congress does not prevent collusion, which implies that the
regulator still receives the lowest income, i.e., sr = 0. Since from Lemma 1 Congress can an-
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ticipate the regulatory outcome in the light of the report r, the regulatory outcome between
a collusive regulator and the rm, which prevents collusion detection, is such that pc = r and
tc = (1  ) Rrq (p) dp.10
To investigate the scope for collusion, we denote by  (; ci; cj)   (; ci; cj)  (; ci; ci)
the gain (or loss) in the prot of a rm with costs ci when a regulator with bargaining power
 reports costs cj instead of the rms real costs ci, i 6= j. If  (; ci; cj) > 0, the rm with
costs ci has an incentive to collude.
Dening
e  1  cq (ch)R ch
cl
q (p) dp
2 (0; 1) (5)
enables us to formally derive the rms stake in collusion.11
Proposition 1 If   e, collusion is never protable for the rm. If  > e, only the rm with
costs cl has a stake in collusion, which is given by
 (; cl; ch) = cq (ch)  (1  )
Z ch
cl
q (p) dp > 0. (6)
The ine¢ cient rm does not collude with the regulator, irrespective of its bargaining power.
This corroborates the standard result that the ine¢ cient rm does not benet from manipulating
its costs. More relevantly, Proposition 1 also reveals that in a regulatory bargaining context the
e¢ cient rm nds it protable to collude only if the regulators bargaining power is relatively
high, i.e.,  > e. Prima facie, this result might appear counterintuitive, since one could expect
the rm to have an incentive to collude with a weak regulator. The rationale behind our result
lies in the trade-o¤ that the e¢ cient rm faces when colluding with the regulator. Figure 2
illustrates the nature of this trade-o¤. On the one hand, the rm has a benet of collusion
cq (ch), which stems from the higher price it is allowed to charge if the regulator declares that
the rm is ine¢ cient. On the other hand, a higher collusive price reduces from
R
cl
q (p) dp toR
ch
q (p) dp the surplus from trade the parties can appropriate through the xed charge. We
know from Lemma 1 that the surplus share of each party depends on its bargaining power.
Therefore, the rm has a stake in collusion only if the benet of a higher price outweighs the
10Any other regulatory outcome would reveal that the regulators report is not truthful, and Congress could
punish the regulator for its misbehavior.
11Note that e > 0 since R ch
cl
q (p) dp  cq (ch) =
R ch
cl
[q (p)  q (ch)] dp > 0, where the inequality follows from
@q
@p
< 0.
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Figure 2: The trade-o¤ from collusion
loss in the surplus from trade the rm incurs in the bargaining process. This is the case when
the regulator is relatively strong and can obtain a large portion of the gains from trade.
To illustrate, with a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er ( = 1), the regulator captures all the gains
from trade the parties can share. Proposition 1 corroborates the standard result that the rm
always has an incentive to collude. At the other extreme, if the rm possesses all the bargaining
power ( = 0), the rms benet of collusion cq (ch) is more than o¤set by the lower gains
from trade the rm can obtain, which fall from
R
cl
q (p) dp to
R
ch
q (p) dp. This result follows
from the familiar deadweight welfare loss due to a price distortion above marginal costs.
It is worth investigating the impact of demand elasticity on the possibility of collusion. To
this end, we consider an isoelastic demand function of the form q (p) = p , where  > 0 captures
the degree of demand elasticity. Di¤erentiating e in (5) with respect to  yields
@e
@
=
c h c
Z ch
cl
p  (ln ch   ln p) dpZ ch
cl
p dp
2 > 0.
The less elastic the demand is (i.e.,  decreases), the lower is the threshold e above which the
e¢ cient rm has an incentive to collude. The idea is that lower demand responsiveness to price
increases the weight of the rms benet of collusion cq (ch) relative to the losses
R ch
cl
q (p) dp in
the surplus from trade the parties share in the bargaining process. In particular, when demand
is inelastic (! 0), the deadweight welfare loss from a price distortion disappears, and the rms
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benet of collusion exactly compensates the losses in the surplus from trade. Since the rm does
not fully internalize these losses (unless it has full bargaining power), its benet of collusion
dominates the cost, and collusion tends to be always protable (e ! 0). This result suggests
that in markets for essential services (e.g., energy, sanitation), which typically exhibit some
demand rigidity, the threat of collusion between the regulator and the rm is more pronounced.
Hence, the design of Congressoptimal response to collusion is even more salient.
5. The optimal institutional response to collusion
We investigate three possible institutional responses to collusion: (i) Congress tolerates collusion
tout court, (ii) Congress deters collusion through an incentive payment to the regulator, (iii)
Congress deters collusion through the shutdown of the ine¢ cient rm.
If Congress tolerates collusion, (expected) consumer surplus is
E [CSc] =  [CS (cl) + (1  )CS (ch)] + (1  )CS (ch)
= CS (ch) + CS, (7)
where CS  CS (cl)   CS (ch). When collusion is allowed, Congress expects to receive the
consumer surplus associated with an ine¢ cient rm independently of the regulators type plus
the gain from having an e¢ cient rm, which materializes only if the regulator is benevolent.
Congress can deter collusion through an incentive payment to the regulator. In line with the
main contributions to the collusion literature (e.g., Baiman et al. 1991; Kofman and Lawarrée
1996), we assume that Congress cannot discriminate between a benevolent and a non-benevolent
regulator when o¤ering an incentive scheme. This can reect institutional and legal constraints
which prevent Congress from making a reward contingent on the regulators type. For instance,
the regulatory sta¤ from a certain region can be more inclined to collude, but rewards cannot
be di¤erentiated on regional basis (La¤ont 2000, Ch. 2). Hence, Congress must remunerate
both an honest and a dishonest regulator to prevent collusion, and the incentive payment can
be only conditional on the regulators report about the rms costs.12
To be e¤ective, the incentive payment to the regulator must (at least) cover the rms
stake in collusion (6), discounted by the shadow cost of side transfers  the rm incurs when
12We know from Section 4 that the collusive outcome is such that Congress cannot infer collusion from the
regulatory policy. Hence, an incentive payment conditional on the regulatory outcome cannot improve Congress
payo¤.
13
colluding with the regulator. Therefore, in order to preclude collusion, the incentive payment
the regulator must receive when declaring that rm is e¢ cient amounts to sr (cl) = 1+ , where
 is given by (6).13
Since we know from Proposition 1 that the ine¢ cient rm does not have any incentive to
collude, the regulator receives its reservation wage from reporting high costs, i.e., sr (ch) = 0.
Hence, if collusion is prevented through an incentive payment, (expected) consumer surplus is
E [CSp] = CS (cl) + (1  )CS (ch)   
1 + 
. (8)
Alternatively, Congress can shut down the production when receiving a report of high costs.
This fully removes the incentive to collude at the cost of forgoing the production of the ine¢ cient
rm. In case of shutdown, (expected) consumer surplus is
E [CSs] = CS (cl) . (9)
Comparing (7), (8) and (9) yields the following result.
Lemma 2 Suppose  > e. Then,
(i) tolerating collusion is more desirable than an incentive payment if and only if 1+ 
(1  ) CS
(ii) the shutdown of the ine¢ cient rm is more desirable than an incentive payment if and
only if  1+  (1  )CS (ch)
(iii) the shutdown of the ine¢ cient rm is more desirable than tolerating collusion if and
only if   e, where
e 
Z
ch
q (p) dp

Z
ch
q (p) dp+ (1  )
Z
cl
q (p) dp
2 (0; 1) .
Lemma 2 collects some natural results. Congress prefers to tolerate collusion rather than
deter collusion through an incentive payment to the regulator if the cost of incentive payment
outweighs the gain in consumer surplus from inducing a self-interested regulator to report
truthfully. The option to shut down the ine¢ cient rm is benecial when the probability of
13Note that any reward lower than 
1+
does not deter collusion, even when the parties bargain over the stake in
collusion. In fact, if Congress o¤ered the regulator such a lower reward, the rm could provide a higher payment,
which makes collusion protable for both parties.
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an e¢ cient rm is high enough. In particular, Congress prefers to forgo the production of the
ine¢ cient rm rather than provide an incentive payment to the regulator if the expected cost
of payment outweighs the expected consumer surplus from ine¢ cient production.
We are now in a position to formalize the optimal institutional response to the possibility
of collusion.
Proposition 2 Suppose  > e and  < e. Then, for   e  R chcl [q(p) q(ch)]dpR ch
cl
q(p)dp
2 (0; 1),
tolerating collusion is optimal if and only if   e and   , where
e  
1    
Z ch
cl
[q (p)  q (ch)] dp
(1  )
Z ch
cl
q (p) dp
 0 for   e
 
Z ch
cl
[q (p)  q (ch)] dp
[1  (1  ) (1 + )]
Z ch
cl
q (p) dp
2 (e; 1] for   e.
Otherwise, an incentive payment to the regulator is optimal. The shutdown of the ine¢ cient
rm is never optimal.
Proposition 3 Suppose  > e and   e. Then, the shutdown of the ine¢ cient rm is optimal
if and only if   max fe; bg, where
b   (1 + )
Z
ch
q (p) dpZ ch
cl
[q (ch)  (1  ) q (p)] dp+  (1 + )
Z
ch
q (p) dp
2 (0; 1) .
Otherwise, an incentive payment to the regulator is optimal. Tolerating collusion is never opti-
mal.
Propositions 2 and 3 provide some plausible predictions. Proposition 2 indicates the con-
ditions under which allowing collusion is optimal. This corroborates the result that, when
incentive payments cannot discriminate between the regulators types, collusion may emerge in
equilibrium (e.g., Kofman and Lawarée 1996). Specically, we nd that tolerating collusion is
desirable when it is too costly to ght through an incentive payment to the regulator. This
is clearly the case if collusive agreements are relatively e¢ cient, i.e.,   e, since an incentive
reward would be too expensive. Moreover, the probability of facing a dishonest regulator must
be low enough, i.e.,   e, which limits the welfare loss from collusion.
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Figure 3: The optimal response to collusion
As Figure 3 illustrates, an additional crucial condition for allowing collusion relates to the
partiesbargaining powers in the regulatory process. We know from (6) that a stronger regulator
increases the rms stake in collusion, which makes the incentive payment to preclude collusion
more costly. As a consequence, tolerating collusion becomes desirable when the regulators
bargaining power is relatively high, i.e.,   .
Proposition 3 reveals that, if the probability of an e¢ cient rm is su¢ ciently high, precluding
collusion is optimal. This can be achieved either by the shutdown of the ine¢ cient rm or by
an incentive payment to the regulator. Di¤erentiating b with respect to  yields after some
manipulation
@b
@
=
(1 + )
Z
ch
q (p) dp
Z ch
cl
[q (ch)  q (p)] dpZ ch
cl
[q (ch)  (1  ) q (p)] dp+  (1 + )
Z
ch
q (p) dp
2 < 0,
where the inequality follows from @q@p < 0, which implies that the second integral in the numerator
is negative. A regulator with a higher bargaining power increases the rms stake in collusion,
and therefore an incentive payment to prevent collusion becomes more costly. This makes the
shutdown policy more attractive.
The results in Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that the relative benets of tolerating collusion
and shutdown depend on the probability of an e¢ cient rm. Conversely, irrespective of the
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ex ante distribution of the rms types, deterring collusion with an incentive payment may be
optimal.
As in Section 4, we now investigate the impact of the demand elasticity on the optimal
response to collusion, using a demand function of the form q (p) = p , where  > 0. Di¤eren-
tiating e, e and  dened in Proposition 2 yields
@e
@
=
c h c
Z ch
cl
p  (ln ch   ln p) dpZ ch
cl
p dp
2 > 0
@e
@
=  
c h c
Z ch
cl
p  (ln ch   ln p) dp
(1  )
Z ch
cl
p dp
2 < 0
@
@
=
c h c
Z ch
cl
p  (ln ch   ln p) dp
[1  (1  ) (1 + )]
Z ch
cl
p dp
2 > 0.
These results indicate that a lower degree of demand elasticity increases the scope for allowing
collusion rather than providing the regulator with an incentive payment. We know from the
discussion following Proposition 1 that the collusion threshold e decreases in the demand elas-
ticity. Therefore, in industries with relatively inelastic demand where the threat of collusion
is more pronounced, tolerating some form of collusion can be more desirable than an incentive
payment, which would be too expensive to implement.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we model regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator
and a regulated rm. In this setting, we investigate the scope for collusion between the two
parties, when the regulator monitors the rms costs and can falsify its report to Congress.
We nd that bargaining between the regulator and the rm crucially a¤ects the collusive
outcome. The e¢ cient rm has an incentive to collude only if the regulators bargaining power
is high enough. This result follows from the trade-o¤ between the benet of a higher collusive
price and the lower gains from trade the parties can share in the bargaining process. Since
these gains are redistributed according to the partiesbargaining powers, a stronger regulator
induces the rm to internalize to a lesser extent the losses in the surplus from trade due to cost
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manipulation. Consequently, if the regulators bargaining power is relatively high, the rms
benet of collusion due to a higher price outweighs the losses in the gains from trade, and the
rm has an incentive to collude. Conversely, a strong rm has a large stake in the gains from
trade and therefore it is more reluctant to collude.
Afterwards, we characterize the optimal institutional response to collusion. Our results in-
dicate that allowing collusion can be optimal when the regulators bargaining power is relatively
high. This policy can be also benecial when consumer demand exhibits some degree of price
rigidity. In other circumstances, however, it can be desirable to preclude collusion through an
incentive payment to the regulator or the shutdown of the ine¢ cient rm.
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Appendix
This Appendix collects the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. Replacing t with  (ci) from (2) into (3) yields
max
p;(ci)
Z
p
q (po) dpo + pq (p)  ciq (p)   (ci)

 [ (ci)]1  .
Taking the rst-order conditions for p and  (ci) yields p ci = 0 and  (ci) (1  )
R
ci
q (p) dp =
0. Standard substitutions imply the results in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (2) and the results in Lemma 1, the change in the prot of a
rm with costs ch when the regulator reports cl is given by
 (; ch; cl)   (; ch; cl)   (; ch; ch) =  (; cl; cl)   (; ch; ch) cq (cl)
= (1  )
Z ch
cl
q (p) dp cq (cl)
=  
Z ch
cl
[q (cl)  (1  ) q (p)] dp < 0,
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where the inequality follows since @q@p < 0 implies that the integrand in the last line is positive.
The change in the prot of a rm with costs cl when the regulator reports ch is given by
 (; cl; ch)   (; cl; ch)   (; cl; cl) =  (; ch; ch)   (; cl; cl) + cq (ch)
= cq (ch)  (1  )
Z ch
cl
q (p) dp,
which is positive if and only if  > e, where e is dened in (5).
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof follows from the comparison of (7), (8) and (9).
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose  > e and  < e. From Lemma 2 it follows that E [CSc] >
E [CSs] for  < e, which implies that shutdown is dominated by the option of tolerating
collusion. Substituting (4) and (6) into (7) and (8) yields after some manipulation
E [CSc]  E [CSp] =  [1  (1  ) (1 + )]
Z ch
cl
q (p) dp 
Z ch
cl
[q (p) dp  q (ch)] dp,
which is non-negative if  < 1  and   , where  > e is dened in the proposition.
We have   1 if   e, where e < 1  is dened in the proposition. Therefore, tolerating
collusion is optimal if   e and   . Otherwise, deterring collusion through an incentive
payment is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose  > e and   e. From Lemma 2 it follows that
E [CSs]  E [CSc] for   e, which implies that tolerating collusion is dominated by shut-
down. Substituting (4) and (6) into (8) and (9) yields
E [CSs]  E [CSp] = 
1 + 
Z ch
cl
[q (ch)  (1  ) q (p)] dp  (1  )
Z
ch
q (p) dp
=

1 + 
Z ch
cl
[q (ch)  (1  ) q (p)] dp+ (1 + )
Z
ch
q (p) dp

  
Z
ch
q (p) dp.
Necessary condition for this expression to be non-negative is that the term in (big) square
brackets is positive. This is the case for  > o 
R ch
cl
[q(p) q(ch)]dpR ch
cl
q(p)dp+(1+)
R
ch
q(p)dp
. Since e > o, the
term in square brackets is always positive under the assumptions in the proposition. Standard
manipulation implies that the entire expression is non-negative if and only if   b, where b
is dened in the proposition. Therefore, shutdown is optimal if   max fe; bg. Otherwise,
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deterring collusion through an incentive payment is optimal.
References
Aidt, T. S. (2003). Economic analysis of corruption: A survey. Economic Journal, 113(491),
632-652.
Amacher, G. S., Malik, A. S. (1996). Bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal
regulator. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30(2), 233-253.
Armstrong, M., Sappington, D. E. M. (2007). Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation.
In: Armstrong, M., Porter, R. (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3. Elsevier
Science Publishers, Amsterdam, pp. 1557-1700.
Baiman, S., Evans III, J. H., Nagarajan, N. J. (1991). Collusion and auditing. Journal of
Accounting Research, 29(1), 1-18.
Baliga, S. (1999). Monitoring and collusion with softinformation. Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization, 15(2), 434-440.
Baron, D. P. (1989). Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions. In: Schmalensee, R.,
Willig, R. D. (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 2. Elsevier Science Publishers,
Amsterdam, 1347-1447.
Binmore, K., Dasgupta, P. (1987). The economics of bargaining. Basic Blackwell, Oxford.
Estache, A., Wren-Lewis, L. (2009). Towards a theory of regulation for developing countries:
Following Jean Jacques La¤onts lead. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(3), 729-770.
Faure-Grimaud, A., La¤ont, J.-J., Martimort, D. (2003). Collusion, delegation and supervision
with soft information. Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), 253-279.
Ida, T., Anbashi, M. (2008). Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection.
Journal of Economics, 93(1), 1-29.
Kahn, A. E. (1988). The economics of regulation: Principles and institutions. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Khalil, F., Lawarrée, J. (2006). Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment.
Journal of Industrial Economics, 54(2), 269-291.
20
Kofman, F., Lawarrée, J. (1993). Collusion in hierarchical agency. Econometrica, 61(3), 629-656.
Kofman, F., Lawarrée, J. (1996). On the optimality of allowing collusion. Journal of Public
Economics, 61(3), 383-407.
La¤ont, J.-J. (2000). Incentives and political economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
La¤ont, J.-J., Rochet, J. C. (1997). Collusion in organization. Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 99(4), 485-495.
La¤ont, J.-J., Tirole, J. (1990). The politics of government decision-making: Regulatory insti-
tutions. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6(1), 1-31.
La¤ont, J.-J., Tirole, J. (1991). The politics of government decision-making: A theory of regu-
latory capture. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1089-1127.
La¤ont, J.-J., Tirole, J. (1993). A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Morriss, A. P., Yandle, B., Dorchak, A. (2005). Choosing how to regulate. Harvard Environ-
mental Law Review, 29, 179-250.
Nash, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18(2), 155-162.
Nash, J. F. (1953). The two-person cooperative games. Econometrica, 21(1), 128-140.
Osborne, M. J., Rubinstein, A. (1990). Bargaining and markets. Academic Press, San Diego.
Rossi, J. (2011). Regulatory bargaining and public law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK.
Sákovics, J. (1993). Delay in bargaining games with complete information. Journal of Economic
Theory, 59(1), 78-95.
Scarpa, C. (1994). Regulation as a bargaining process: Negotiation over price and cost-reducing
investments. Oxford Economic Papers, 46(3), 357-365.
Spulber, D. F. (1988). Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand
and supply. Journal of Economic Theory, 44(2), 251-268.
Spulber, D. F. (1989). Regulation and markets. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
21
Stigler, G. J. (1971). The economic theory of regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Man-
agement Science, 2(1), 3-21.
Tirole, J. (1986). Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations.
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2(2), 181-214.
Tirole, J. (1992). Collusion and the theory of organization. In: La¤ont, J.-J. (ed.), Advances in
Economic Theory. Sixth World Congress, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
pp. 151-206.
Viscusi, W. K., Harrington, J. E., Vernon, J. M. (2005). Economics of regulation and antitrust.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
22
